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ABSTRACT
We estimate the effect of immigrant flows on native employment in Western Europe, and then
ask whether the employment consequences of immigration vary with institutions that affect labor market
flexibility. Reduced flexibility may protect natives from immigrant competition in the near term, but our
theoretical framework suggests that reduced flexibility is likely to increase the negative impact of
immigration on equilibrium employment. In models without interactions, OLS estimates for a panel of
European countries in the 1980s and 1990s show small, mostly negative immigration effects. To reduce
bias from the possible endogeneity of immigration flows, we use the fact that many immigrants arriving
after 1991 were refugees from the Balkan wars. An IV strategy based on variation in the number of
immigrants from former Yugoslavia generates larger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. We
then estimate models allowing interactions between the employment response to immigration and
institutional characteristics including business entry costs. These results, limited to the sample of native
men, generally suggest that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact of immigration. Many of the
estimated interaction terms are significant, and imply a significant negative effect on employment in
countries with restrictive institutions.
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angrist@mit.edu adriana.kugler@econ.upf.es1European country studies include Pischke and Velling (1997) for Germany; Winter-Ebmer and
Zweimuller (1997) for Austria, and Dolado, Duce, and Jimeno (1996) for Spain.  Similar to Card’s (1990) Mariel
Boatlift research design, Hunt (1994) compares regions in France after Algerian independence and Carrington and
deLima (1996) compare Portugal and Spain after an influx of Portuguese returnees.  Hunt’s (1992) results show
more evidence of disemployment effects than the American studies while Carrington and deLima’s (1996) results
are inconclusive.  
Paralleling American interest in the consequences of immigration, recent years have seen increased
debate over the impact of immigration in Western Europe.  The European immigration debate is fueled by
the fact that immigration now accounts for the bulk of population growth in the European Union (EU; OECD,
1999a).  Many observers have also noted that increased immigration is likely to be part of any strategy to
keep European social security systems solvent.  At the same time, the rise in immigration is associated with
high levels of anti-foreigner sentiment, and the view that immigrants take jobs from natives is widespread
in Europe (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann, 2000).  The evidence on the employment consequences of
immigration in Europe is more fragmentary and harder to assess than the US evidence, which generally
shows few effects (see, Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).  In a recent survey, however, Bauer and Zimmermann
(1999) conclude that, popular sentiment notwithstanding, the employment consequences of immigration for
European natives have probably also been modest.
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This paper takes a fresh look at the employment consequences of immigration in Western Europe,
focusing on a new aspect of the immigration question.  A large literature looks at the relationship between
labor market institutions and employment levels in Europe.  Some observers have argued that persistently
high unemployment in Europe is due to institutions that increase turnover and employment costs (see, e g.,
OECD, 1994).  Recently, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) extended this inquiry by suggesting that the negative
employment consequences of a rigid labor market are felt not so much in good times, but rather in the labor
market’s response to adverse demand shocks.  We similarly integrate the debate over institutions with the
impact of shocks that occur on the labor-supply side.  In particular, we ask whether labor market institutions,
such as employment protection, high replacement rates, and business entry costs, affect the employment
consequences of immigration-induced increases in the work force.2Earlier theoretical studies of interactions between immigration effects and labor market flexibility include
Schmidt, Stilz, and Zimmermann (1994) and Razin and Sadka (1996).
3The modern EU includes 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The EEA includes
these plus 3 of 4 states in the European Free Trade Area: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.  Our sample omits
Liechtenstein but includes Switzerland, which opted out of the EEA.
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While labor market institutions play a number of roles, one rationale for institutions that reduce
flexibility is to protect natives and especially incumbent workers from competition in the labor and product
markets.  In fact, Rodrik (1997) has argued that the demand for social insurance is in no small measure a
response to the pressures of global economic integration, including migration.  But the equilibrium
consequences of protective regulations and institutions are unclear.  We therefore begin with a theoretical
discussion of interactions with institutions.  Although employment protection and entry barriers may reduce
job loss in the short run, our theoretical discussion shows how restrictive institutions can be counter-
productive, eventually amplifying the negative employment consequences of immigration for natives.
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The main empirical relationship of interest in our study is the effect of immigrant shares on native
employment rates, where this effect is allowed to vary with institutional characteristics.  Our empirical
implementation uses a panel data set for up to 18 European Economic Area (EEA) countries for 1983-99.
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At our request, the European Commission’s statistical agency (Eurostat) produced consistent time series of
immigration measures and labor market variables by age, sex, education, and country.  These statistics are
derived from a series of country-specific labor-force surveys (LFS) using a similar format across countries
and over time.  This data set allows us to conduct analyses similar to previous immigration research for the
US and individual European countries using micro data, while allowing consistent cross-country
comparisons.  Since European countries define immigrants in terms of nationality, while North American
definitions are based on nativity (country of birth), we also briefly compare alternative definitions of
immigrant status in Europe, distinguishing non-natives from non-nationals. 
In addition to exploring interactions with institutions, our cross-country analysis addresses some of3
the methodological questions raised in the previous immigration literature.  First, a country sample may
reduce any mobility of immigrants or natives that might otherwise mask immigration effects.  Second, and
most importantly, we experiment with an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, as well as reporting OLS and
fixed-effects estimates.  The IV estimates exploit the two 1990s Balkan Wars (in Bosnia and Kosovo) as a
source of exogenous variation providing a shock to immigrant flows.  During this period, many immigrants
and refugees came from former Yugoslavia.  As a consequence, the distance between European population
centers and the former Yugoslav republics is highly correlated with the wartime proportion of the labor force
from non-EU countries, while essentially uncorrelated with the foreign share from EU countries.  We
implement an estimation strategy based on this variation by using the distance from Sarajevo and the distance
from Pristina, interacted with dummies for the war years, as instruments for the immigrant share.  
I.  Theoretical Framework
We use a competitive model with two types of labor and exogenous separations to illustrate the
standard theoretical predictions regarding the impact of that immigrants on natives, and to suggest how the
effect of immigrants on native employment might be modified by differences in labor market institutions,
such as firing costs.  Our theoretical setup is similar to that used in earlier analyses of immigration questions,
augmented with elements used by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Saint Paul (1996) to study the effects
of labor market regulation and employment protection. 
Firm output is assumed to be produced by immigrants and natives with production function,
f(θtgt[Nt, It]); 




where Nt is the number of natives (or nationals) and It is the number of immigrants (or non-nationals).  The
variable gt is a CES-type labor aggregate as in Card (2001); output depends on other factors of production,
but this is ignored in the notation.  The variable θt is an exogenous shifter as in Lalonde and Topel (1991).4As in Angrist and Acemoglu (2001), productivity shocks are high enough and firing costs low enough that
laying off unproductive workers is indeed worthwhile.   In practice, productivity may be endogenous and
determined in part by employment protection (see Ichino and Riphahn, 2000, for evidence). We ignore hiring costs
since adjustment costs are linear in our model (as in Saint-Paul, 1996).  
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The first derivative of the production function, f(·), is positive and the second derivative is negative.  Our
approach differs modestly from others in the literature in that we have CES interaction between immigrants
and natives as a group.  In Altonji and Card (1991), for example, immigrant-native complementarity is
generated by differences in the skill or education mix of the two groups, with immigrants and natives at the
same skill level being perfect substitutes.  This approach is harder to motivate in the European context, since
immigrants to the EU are not dramatically less educated than natives.  Immigrants with the same measured
skills may also complement natives because of language or craft skills.
An important feature of many European labor markets is high firing costs.  These come in the form
of bureaucratic limitations on dismissals, requirements for severance pay, and restrictive collective
bargaining agreements.  On the other hand, immigrants are probably less likely than natives to be covered
by these provisions since immigrants are more likely to work in non-union jobs, on fixed-term contracts (e.g.,
if they have only temporary work permits), or illegally.  We therefore introduce positive firing costs in the
amount CN for natives, with no firing costs for immigrants.  Firing costs are paid when, every period, a
proportion  λ of the labor force becomes unproductive in the current job, and is therefore laid off.
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Immigrants and natives are paid different real wages, wNt and wIt, with the price of output as numeraire.   
Our interest is in immigration effects and interactions with institutions in a simple dynamic setup.
We assume price-taking firms act to maximize the present value of profits, with discount factor φ. In this
case, firms’ objective functions can be written,
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Π =   3  φ
t[f(θtgt[Nt, It]) - wNtNt - wItIt - λCNNt-1].
t=0
Since adjustment costs are linear, time subscripts can be dropped and the objective simplified:5
Π =   (1-φ)
-1[f(θg) - wNN - wII - φλCNN]. (1)
Employment levels are chosen to satisfy the first order conditions
fN(θg)θgN = wN  + φλCN = wN(1 + φλcN) (2a)
and
fN(θg)θgI = wI, (2b)
where gN and gI are derivatives of g[N, I].  Equation (2a), which implicitly defines the demand function for
native labor, equates the flow cost of native workers with their marginal product.  The flow cost of
employing immigrants is just the immigrant wage.  Note that firing costs are now defined as proportional to
the native wage: cN /CN/wN, a ratio that we take to be fixed.
The labor supply of immigrants is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, at least for the range of wage
levels observed in the host country.  The immigrant population is denoted by M, employed in equal numbers
at each of m identical firms, so that I=M/m.  In contrast, native labor supply is elastic and determined by a
second institutional characteristic, unemployment insurance replacement rates, as well as by wages.  The
distinction between immigrant and native labor supply seems reasonable since natives are more likely than
immigrants to have access to social insurance.  The native labor supply function is
N
* = mN = [wN(1-r)]
εP, (3)
where P is the native population, r is the UI or social insurance replacement rate, and ε is the native labor
supply elasticity, assumed to be positive.  For what follows, it is useful to define the inverse labor supply
function, wN(N, ε) /(mN/P)
1/ε(1-r)
-1.
The short-run analysis of this model takes the number of firms, m, to be fixed, while the long-run
response is determined by allowing m to be endogenous and determined by the condition that profits are
greater than entry costs.  In the short run, equations (2a), (2b), and (3) determine the two endogenous wage
levels, and the number of employed natives.  Since immigrant labor supply is exogenous, the key equilibrium
condition can be written as follows5If there are no firing costs and f(·) is linear, so the production function is constant-returns CES with labor
inputs alone, then the left hand side of (4) can be written as a linear combination of lnN, lnI, and the log of the
immigrant share.
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lnfN(θg[N, I]) + lnθ + lngN[N, I] = lnwN + ln(1 + φλcN) 
 =  (1/ε)ln(N/P) + (1/ε)lnm + φλcN  + r.( 4 )
This equation determines native employment, which can then be substituted back into the labor supply
equation to find native wages. 
Equation (4) provides a basis for the empirical work in this paper.  Following Lalonde and Topel
(1991), we think of the estimates, which relate the log of native employment to the log of the immigrant share
in the labor force, as approximating lnfN(θg) + lngN to first order in logs.
5  The estimating equation is assumed
to hold at the country level since we imagine all firms are identical except possibly for the shift variable, θ,
which is assumed to be absorbed by country and year effects.  Before turning to the empirical results, we use
this theoretical framework to suggest the likely nature of interactions between labor market institutions and
immigration.  In particular, we are interested in the short-run impact of immigration on total native
employment,  N
*/mN, and the question of whether MN
*/MM changes with firing costs, cN; replacement rates,
r; and the degree of native wage flexibility.  We also consider long-run impacts and the interaction between
immigration and barriers to entry.
The short-run employment impact of immigration can be written in elasticity terms as follows,
dlnN
*/dlnM = (MN/MI)(I/N) = ξNI[ε
-1 - ξNN]
-1 / e(N, ε), (5)
where ξNI and ξNN are the elasticities of factor price for native wage rates with respect to native and immigrant
employment. That is,  ξNN=(MwN/MN)(N/wN) and ξNI=(MwN/MI)(I/wN) along the demand curve for native labor.
We use the e(N, ε) shorthand for dlnN
*/dlnM to highlight the fact that parameters other than the labor supply
elasticity modify the immigrant impact through native employment levels.  This expression, derived in the
appendix, is similar to the corresponding relationship in Johnson’s (1980) static model, though in our case,
immigration has an ambiguous effect on native employment.  While ξNN is negative, so the denominator is6The appendix shows ∆ to be [(1/ε)N
-1 - (fNN/fN)θgN - gNN/gN] > 0.  Firing costs reduce employment in our
model with cross-sectional employment differences, but have an ambiguous effect in partial-equilibrium models
with cyclical shocks (as in Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).  In a general-equilibrium setting, firing costs also reduce
profitability and investment, with consequent job losses (see Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993).
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positive, ξNI in the numerator can be positive or negative depending on the extent of immigrant-native
complementarity.  In a setup like ours, however, immigration is predicted to reduce native wage rates for
most plausible parameter values (see, e.g., Altonji and Card, 1991; Ichino, 1993), in which case e(N, ε) is
negative.  If immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes (ρ=1), then ξNI and e(N, ε) are necessarily
negative.  Assuming ξNI is negative, as we do in the discussion which follows, immigration reduces native
employment, with larger effects when native labor supply is more elastic. 
  To see how the employment effects predicted by (5) are affected by changes in firing costs, note that
cN does not appear directly in the derivative e(N, ε).  Thus, any change in employment response is due to the
impact of firing costs on employment levels.  That is, 
Me/McN = [Me/MN][MN/McN].
It is clear from (4) that firing costs reduce employment in this model.  In particular, 
MN/McN = -φλ/∆, < 0,  
where ∆ is (1/N) times the denominator in (5).
6  The scale effect, Me/MN, is likely to be positive, i.e., there







The wage decline for natives from a given percentage increase in immigrants will likely be smaller (in
absolute value) the more natives there are, so the first term on the right hand side is typically positive.  The
second term is also positive if MξNN/MN is negative. Standard results from demand theory suggest this is a
reasonable presumption: in a constant-returns, two-factor model, demand becomes less elastic as factor
shares increase, so ξNN becomes more negative as N grows (see Hammermesh, 1986).  8
These considerations suggest scale effects are indeed positive and therefore the employment loss due
to immigration is probably made worse by firing costs.   The intuition for this result is straightforward: firing
costs reduce native employment levels in our set-up, and reduced employment makes the negative
employment consequences of a given number of immigrants worse.  Of course, as an empirical matter, scale
effects may be small or hard to measure, and, at least in the short run, firing costs are likely to protect
incumbent native workers from dismissal.
The analysis of changing r parallels the discussion of firing costs since replacement rates do not
appear directly in (5).  Note that 
Me/Mr = [Me/MN][MN/Mr].




so higher replacement rates increase any job loss due to immigration.  The intuition for this result is the same
as for the interaction with firing costs: high replacement rates reduce native employment levels, and reduced
employment makes the negative employment consequences of immigration worse.
We omit a detailed analysis of the impact of union wage setting or minimum wages, but look briefly
at a stylized model of inflexible wages.  Suppose that native wages are fixed at a binding minimum or
contract wage, w
G





which is e(N, ε) with ε=4, and is clearly more negative than e(N, ε) with ε unrestricted.  This is the first-order
effect; a higher w
G
N also reduces employment, leading to the same sort of scale effect discussed earlier for
firing costs and replacement rates.  Since the wage-setting mechanism is not specified, our analysis omits
any feedback effects whereby union wage demands are moderated as a consequence of competition from
immigrants.  In a fully-specified bargaining scenario, as in Schmidt, Stilz, and Zimmermann (1994),
immigration may reduce displacement effects by moderating union wage demands.7Even if native wages were to rise due to immigrant-native complementarity, it can be shown that profits
increase as long as the overall production function exhibits diminishing returns.  
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A.  Long-run Effects 
Suppose now that the number of firms, m, is an endogenous variable eventually determined by the
requirement that profits equal entry costs.  To see the consequences of endogenous m for immigration effects,
we first analyze the effect of immigration on profits. The effect of an increase in M on profits with a fixed
number of firms is approximately
MΠ/MM = (1-φ)
-1{ -N(MwN/MM) - I(MwI/MM) },
where N is the equilibrium employment level of natives.  This expression is derived by observing that the
envelope theorem allows us to ignore terms in MΠ/MN and MΠ/MI.  In the short run, increased immigration
clearly increases profits in this model because immigrant wages must fall and native wages have been
presumed to fall in our previous discussion.  As Borjas (1995) notes, the increase in profits due to
immigration is generated because, while the last workers hired is still paid value of marginal product, infra-
marginal workers are paid less.  The exception is if there are there are constant returns for labor inputs alone,
i.e., fNN(·)=0, in which case profits are always zero and there may be no entry.
7 
Assuming profits were equal to entry costs before immigration and there are diminishing returns to
labor inputs, the increase in profits after immigration induces the entry of new firms.  Because the entering
firms employ additional workers, both immigrant and native, the possibility of endogenous entry reduces and
may even eliminate any negative impact of immigration on native employment.  To see this, note that with
free entry, the effect of immigration on aggregate employment can be show to be
(MN
*/MM)(M/N
*) = e(N, ε)[1- Mlnm/MlnM] - ξNN[ε
-1 - ξNN]
-1 (Mlnm/MlnM) (6)
where  e(N, ε) is the short-run employment response defined in equation (5).  This long-run impact is derived
in the appendix.  Since ξNN <0 and Mlnm/MlnM  #1, the response with entry is less negative than in the fixed-
number-of-firms case and can even be positive.  With perfect substitution, i.e., ρ=1, the short-run impact of8See Bertrand and Kramarz (2001) for recent evidence on the employment consequences of entry costs in
the retail industry in France.
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immigration on native employment is necessarily negative, but the long-run impact is zero.
Although entry may eventually raise employment back to pre-immigration levels, in the theoretical
medium-run, immigrants will have a diminished, though still negative effect on native employment.  So
factors that inhibit entry are likely to increase or prolong the displacement of natives by immigrants.
Moreover, entry costs probably interact with other wage rigidities, such as firing costs and sticky wages, to
aggravate job losses from immigration for two reasons.  First, factors that increase labor costs will tend to
reduce or slow  the entry of firms in response to low-cost immigrant labor.  Second, entry costs that reduce
native employment levels will interact negatively with other rigidities because of the short-run scale effect.
8
On balance, therefore, our model clearly predicts an association between barriers to entry and native job
losses due to immigration.
Overall, the theoretical discussion suggests that the relationship between immigration and native
employment is likely to vary across countries according to employment laws, replacement rates, wage-setting
institutions, and business entry costs.  The impact of unions is hard to measure since most Western
Europeans are covered by collective bargaining agreements whether or not they are union members.  We
therefore focus on interactions with measures of labor market flexibility, replacement rates, and barriers to
entrepreneurship.  To establish a baseline, however, we begin with a reduced-form analysis of immigration
effects that omits interactions with institutional characteristics.
II.  Background and Data Description
A. Descriptive Statistics
OECD and other EEA countries have long been host to refugees and economic migrants.  In recent
years, the European countries with the largest proportion of labor force from non-EU countries have been9Information on data sources and extracts is provided in the data appendix. 
11
Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.  This can be seen in Table 1, which reports
descriptive statistics from the Eurostat labor force surveys for 18 EU and other EEA countries.
9  France and
the UK absorb many immigrants from former colonies, while Germany and Austria accept large numbers
of migrants from Turkey and Eastern Europe, especially Poland.  Sweden has a large foreign population,
many of whom come from Middle Eastern countries.  Another important supply factor in some countries is
the absorption of large numbers of ethnically similar migrants.  Germany, for example, accepts large numbers
of ethnic Germans (known as Aussiedler), mostly from the former Soviet Union.  Similarly, roughly 45
percent of the foreign population in Greece in 1997 was of Greek background, mostly from the former Soviet
Union and Albania (OECD, 1999a).
Figure 1 documents the time pattern of immigration for many of the important immigrant-receiving
countries.  The figure plots log counts of foreign inflows relative to the count in base year, 1983. There was
little change in immigration through 1988, but the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a marked upturn.  The
increases were sharpest for Germany, beginning in 1989, with strong increases later in Finland, France, and
Sweden.  The Benelux countries and Switzerland show a more gradual, hump-shaped pattern.  Norway
received more immigrants in the 1980s than in the 1990s, while Denmark experienced the largest increase
after 1994.
The flow from former Yugoslavia became an important part of the European migration picture after
1990.  This flow was generated by the collapse of the Yugoslav state, and especially by the Bosnian and
Kosovo wars at the beginning and end of the decade.  Figure 2 shows that the number of former Yugoslavian
asylum-seekers peaked in 1992, the year that Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state and Bosnian
Serbs laid siege to Sarajevo, and again in 1999, when NATO launched air strikes on Yugoslavia.  Figure 2
also shows that Yugoslavs accounted for more than 30 percent of all asylum-seekers in the war years.
Yugoslav asylum seekers were a significant part of the total foreign inflow, with wartime modes at 10-1512
percent. Since many foreigners in EU countries come from other EU countries, the effect of the Yugoslav
asylum seekers on the non-EU foreign share is considerably larger than indicated by the figure.  Our data
show that in the 1995-99 period, for EU countries with information on immigrants’ country of origin, roughly
one-third of male immigrants aged 20-59 from non-EU countries were from former Yugoslavia.
The importance of migration within the EU is also documented in Table 1.  In some countries, many
non-national residents in the labor force are from other developed European nations.  Luxembourg is a clear
outlier, with over one-third of its labor force from other EU countries.  France is more typical, with 2-3
percent of its labor force from other EU countries.  In the analysis below, we distinguish between EU and
non-EU foreigners, and use this distinction to control for intra-EU migration that potentially responds to the
number of non-EU immigrants.
B. Nationality Versus Nativity
The immigration statistics in Table 1 are based on a distinction between home-country nationals and
resident non-nationals, the latter group consisting of what Europeans typically call “foreigners” and what
Americans refer to as “resident aliens”.  Most discussions of immigration in Europe use an immigrant
definition based on nationality.  Thus, ethnic Germans moving to Germany are not counted in a nationality-
based definition of immigrants, while any immigrants who become naturalized citizens cease to be identified
as immigrants on a nationality basis.  In contrast, in Australia, the US, and Canada, countries with a long
tradition of immigrant absorption, immigrants are usually defined by nativity; i.e., an immigrant is any
foreign-born resident whether or not a citizen of the host country.  Countries defining immigrants by nativity
tend to have higher naturalization rates than countries using nationality definitions.  
The LFS data allow us to explore the overlap between alternative definitions of immigrant status in10We have data on country of birth only for 1992-99.  Statistics for 1996 are typical of this period.  A
shortcoming of the LFS data is that the national sampling frames are mostly limited to private households, therefore
missing immigrants in relocation camps and hostels.  This may affect descriptive statistics for the immigrant
population, but is probably less important for samples of labor force participants.
11Most EU countries now have provisions for the naturalization of native-born children of non-nationals at
age 18.  For example, Germany’s 1990 Act of Naturalization “specifically extended naturalization to young
foreigners who have lived in Germany for a long time and wish to remain there.”  (OECD, 1995, p.  166).
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1996.
10  The first two columns of Table 2 report the proportion of non-nationals who are foreign born,
separately for EU and non-EU nationals.  The statistics in the table are for men and women aged 20-59.
These columns show that in all countries for which we have data on country of birth, almost all of those with
non-EU nationality were foreign born.  Thus, among adults, most non-nationals are indeed immigrants.
11  On
the other hand, columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show that many foreign born residents of EEA countries became
naturalized citizens, or were granted citizenship on the basis of ethnicity at the time they arrived in the host
country.  In France, for example, about half of the residents born in a non-EU country obtained French
citizenship.  This figure probably includes a large number of people from former French colonies, including
people of French ancestry or mixed descent.
Naturalization rates for non-Europeans are surprisingly high overall, but the last two columns show
that few recent arrivals were naturalized.  These columns report naturalization rates for foreign born
residents who arrived in the last five years, separately for EU and non-EU countries of birth.  For example,
for those born in non-EU countries, the recent-arrival naturalization rate is essentially zero in France, 9
percent in Belgium, and 7 percent in the UK.  This is not surprising since many EU countries impose an
extensive waiting period before naturalization is possible.
In many countries, naturalization rates are lower for recent arrivals born in other EU countries than
for those born outside the EU.  This probably reflects increasing mobility between EU member states, and
the fact that EU citizenship in any country already grants many citizenship privileges in other EU countries.
Another interesting feature of the table is the relatively high naturalization rate for recent arrivals in Germany
and Greece.  As noted earlier, this reflects a preponderance of same-ethnicity migrants coming from the14
former Soviet Union and (in the case of Greece) Albania.  On balance, however, the statistics in Table 2
suggest that for most countries, the group of non-nationals can be seen as roughly coincident with the group
of recently-arrived foreign born residents.  Following the theoretical discussion, we briefly explore the
implications of the nationality/nativity distinction for our estimates.
C.  Immigrant Employment Policies and Immigrant/Native Comparisons  
Before turning to the estimates, we briefly discuss government policies and a few statistics relating
to the ease of labor-market access for European immigrants.  The OECD (e.g., 1999a) migration volumes
describe select aspects of immigration policies in the EU.  Of special relevance for our study is the treatment
of immigrants and asylum-seekers from Yugoslavia since we use the Balkan Wars as a source of exogenous
variation in immigrant flows.  Official policy appears to allow many of these people to work, at least around
the time of the Bosnia war.
In Austria, which absorbed 100,000 Bosnian refugees between 1992 and 1995, the majority of
Bosnians have a long-term work entitlement.  Germany has made it more difficult to obtain asylum since
1993, but the largest number of asylum seekers come from former Yugoslavia, and many work permits were
apparently issued to asylum seekers and other foreigners, especially in 1994 and 1995. Italy saw a tripling
of foreign employment between 1990 and 1997, a large decline in unemployment among foreigners, and a
large expansion of service-sector employment fueled by immigrants, in spite of the fact that an estimated
89% of asylum seekers entered Italy illegally in recent years.  In Sweden in 1998, the largest immigrant group
in the labor force after the Fins were those from former Yugoslavia.  A special visa program for Bosnians
and other parts of the former Yugoslavia operated in Sweden from 1993-96.  The largest number of migrants
to Switzerland between 1994 and 1997 also came from former Yugoslavia; the largest group of non-EU
workers in Switzerland in this period were Yugoslavs. 
Participation rates for immigrants are typically below those for natives, but most immigrant men aged15
20-59, including those from former Yugoslavia, are in the labor force.  This can be seen in Table 3, which
reports labor-force participation rates for natives and non-EU immigrants, with statistics for immigrants
shown separately for those arriving in the past 5 years (recent arrivals) and those arriving earlier (veteran
immigrants).  The table reports statistics averaged for all available years from 1995-99 since this is the period
when LFS coverage was broadest.
Participation rates for veteran male immigrants are generally close to those for natives, and even
higher than for natives in Italy, Austria, Greece, and Spain.  As many other researchers have found, our data
generally show recent immigrants have lower participation rates than both natives and veteran immigrants.
On the other hand, the majority of male immigrants count themselves as in the labor force in every country.
The contrast between natives and recent immigrant is larger for women than for men in many countries.  It
is also worth noting that the participation rates for Yugoslavs are similar to those of other non-EU immigrant
groups in most countries.  In Sweden, for example, 79 percent of veteran Yugoslav men and 81 percent of
other veteran non-EU men were in the labor force, while 65 percent of recent Yugoslav men and 62 percent
of other recent non-EU men were in the labor force. 
Unemployment is typically higher among immigrants than natives, so the difference in employment
rates by nativity generally exceeds the difference in participation rates.  This can be seen in panel B of Table
3, which reports employment-to-population ratios.  Most veteran immigrant men were working, and
employment rates in most countries were similar for veterans who immigrated from former Yugoslavia and
those who immigrated from other non-EU countries.  The employment rates of recently arrived Yugoslavs
were lower than those of veteran Yugoslavs, ranging from 27 percent for men in the UK, to rates above 75
percent in Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain.   Again, the employment pattern of recent arrivals from
Yugoslavia are typically similar to those of other recent immigrants from non-EU countries, though there are
exceptions.  The officially measured employment rates for immigrants generally increase with time in
country.  And, as we noted earlier, the distinction between officially-measured employment and labor force12The sample used to compare schooling levels omits Germany, Iceland, and Switzerland.
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participation may not be clear-cut for immigrants. 
Also relevant are the comparative skill and education levels of immigrants and natives, since there
is probably more competition for jobs within groups than between groups.  Our LFS extract includes
information on the size of three schooling groups, categorized by International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED) levels 0-2, 3-4, and 5 and above.  ISCED level 2 typically denotes a ninth grade
education,  and corresponds to the end of compulsory education in many countries.  We therefore define the
“low-educated” as those with ISCED levels 0-2 and compare proportions in this group.
Averaging data for 1995 and 1999, about 33 percent of native men in our sample are in the low-
education group.
12  The proportion is higher for veteran immigrants from non-EU countries, about 42 percent,
with the proportion low-educated similar among recent non-EU immigrants at 40 percent.  Recent immigrants
from Yugoslavia are similarly less-educated, with about 39 percent in the low-education group.  The
proportion with low education is even higher among veteran male immigrants from Yugoslavia, roughly 48
percent.  Almost half of non-EU female immigrants are low-educated (47 percent); likewise for recent
Yugoslav women.  The least educated group consists of veteran female immigrants from Yugoslavia, where
65 percent are less-educated.  The immigrant/native contrast in schooling levels is larger for women than for
men since only 37 percent of native women are in the low-education group.  Overall, however, the education
statistics show considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling distributions.
III.  Estimates of Immigration Effects
A.  OLS Estimates
The equation of interest links the employment rates of natives with the  proportion of the labor force
that is non-national or foreign born.  In particular, we estimate
ln(yijt) = µi + δt + βj + αiln(sjt) + εijt (7)13For the purposes of this distinction, we define “EU countries” on a time-invariant basis though EU
membership was changing.  See the appendix for details.
14We look at the employment effects of immigrants who count themselves as in the labor force, i.e.,
working or actively looking for work but unemployed, as opposed to measuring immigrants as a proportion of
population.  This seems like a conservative approach to measuring the size of the immigrant group that can affect
natives, since immigrants who can not legally work may nevertheless work illegally, while still reporting themselves
as out of the labor force in surveys.  Unemployed immigrants may also put downward pressure on native wages.
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for demographic group i, country j, and year t.  The model includes country and year effects, βj and δt, with
group main effects included when demographic groups are pooled.  The regressor ln(sjt) is the log of the
immigrant share and the dependent variable is the log of the employment-to-population ratio for natives. The
immigrant share is defined as either the proportion of the labor force made up of non-nationals from non-EU
countries, or the proportion of the labor force born in non-EU countries.
13  As noted above, we think of this
equation as approximating the first-order condition determining native employment.  This can also be seen
as a general reduced-form relationship between native employment and the immigrant share.  In either case,
the most important omitted variables are time-varying productivity or labor demand shocks correlated with
both immigrant shares and native employment.
14
The first set of estimates, reported in Table 4, use data for 1992-99 only.  This table briefly explores
the consequences of switching from nationality-based to nativity-based definitions of immigrant status.  For
example, the first row shows a negative but insignificant relationship between the non-national share  in the
labor force and male nationals’ employment rates.  The estimates remain insignificant  when pooled across
age and schooling groups, when estimated separately for young and old workers, and when estimated in three
separate schooling groups.  Estimates using nationality definitions are likewise insignificant for women,
though less precise as well.  
The second panel in Table 4 shows that switching from a nationality-based to a nativity-based
definition of immigrant status fails to generate any evidence of an employment-immigration relationship.
On the other hand, the third panel in the table, which replaces the non-native share with the proportion of
the labor force consisting of immigrants who arrived in the last five years, shows a negative and significant15Card (2001) similarly argues that recent immigrants may be more likely than veteran immigrants to
compete with less-skilled natives.  
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effect on the employment rates of less-educated men.  This finding is consistent with the view that recent
arrivals are more likely than veteran immigrants to undercut less-skilled natives in the labor market.  Veteran
immigrants probably behave more like natives, with higher wages, and a higher probability of coverage by
labor laws and collective-bargaining agreements.
15  The magnitude of the effects for less-educated men is
such that an increase in the recent immigrant share of 10 percent would reduce native employment rates by
less than a third of a percent, or a little over 2/10 of a  percentage point.  On a per-worker basis, this estimate
implies that 100 immigrants in the labor force cost about 30 native jobs.
The remainder of the analysis uses a nationality-based definition of immigrant status because
nationality variables are available in our sample beginning in 1983, while the country-of-birth variables start
in 1992.  The longer period generates more precise estimates, facilitates control for country trends, and
allows us to implement an instrumental variables strategy based on the Balkan wars.  It should also be noted
that the Balkan war instruments may disproportionately capture the effects of recent arrivals.  Of course,
recent arrivals have lower labor force participation than veterans, but our endogenous regressor includes only
those immigrants who are in the labor force.
Table 5 reports OLS estimates for the 1983-99 sample period, with additional estimates for 1992-99
for comparison.  In addition to including more data, the model used to construct the estimates reported in
Table 5 differs from equation (7) in that it also includes the share of the labor force from EU countries.  That
is, in addition to the log of the non-EU foreign share, ln(sjt), the estimating equation also includes the log of
the foreign share with EU nationality outside the country of residence, ln(ujt).  As noted earlier, many EU
countries have a large number of foreign residents from other EU countries. These internal EU migrants are
probably similar in some respects to US internal migrants, in that they are drawn to host countries by job
assignments and employment opportunities.19
Figure 3 plots one non-national share variable against the other, after removing country and year
effects.  This figure shows that the EU and non-EU foreign shares are, in fact, positively correlated.  This
finding is similar to Pischke and Velling’s (1997) results for Germany, which show that immigrants and
natives seem to be attracted to the same locations.  In our case, the positive correlation in the two foreign
share variables suggests that migration within the EU does not act to “undo” the effects of non-EU migrants.
We nevertheless leave the EU share in some of the estimating equations as a proxy to control for omitted
variables that might bias the OLS estimates.  These omitted variables include host-country economic
conditions that are likely to attract migrants.  
Not surprisingly, the results for 1992-99 in Table 5 are similar to those for the same period shown
in Table 4, again offering no significant evidence of an immigrant-employment relationship.  The only
difference in specification here is the inclusion of the EU share variable, which is positively correlated with
native employment.  This positive correlation, however, is unlikely to be causal, and probably reflects the
“pull” exerted by employment opportunities in one EU country on other EU residents.  
Extending the sample back to 1983 changes the story somewhat.  First, note that we no longer report
estimates by schooling group in the extended sample because the schooling variables are unavailable in the
LFS in the earlier period.  Second, pooling the young and old age groups leads to a negative and statistically
significant effect on male native employment of -.021.  The difference between this result and that for the
92-99 sample is partly because the effect is larger and partly because it is estimated more precisely.
Estimates using young  men only show an even larger negative effect of -.037.  The pattern of estimates for
younger women using 1983-99 data is similar, with more negative effects in the longer sample, though only
the estimate for younger women is close to significant.  
Equation (7) relies on time-invariant country effects to control for omitted variables correlated with
immigration rates.  OLS estimates of the parameters in this equation are biased if immigration is correlated
with omitted time-varying variables or country-specific trends, a problem that is likely to be worse with a16Schwartz (1973) is an early study documenting the impact of distance on migration.
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longer time-series sample.  We therefore also report results replacing the country effect, βj, with a country-
specific linear trend, β0j + β1jt.  The marginally significant negative employment effects for younger women
become slightly larger and more precise in models with country trends, but the results for younger men, while
still negative, are smaller, less precise, and no longer significantly different from zero.  The estimates pooling
age groups are negative but insignificant for both men and women in models with country trends.  
B.  IV Estimates
The OLS estimates for 1983-99 are all negative, though not significant in most of the models that
control for country trends.  But the OLS estimates may be biased upwards by immigrants choosing to locate
in countries where their employment prospects are best.  This section discusses estimates of immigration
effects in the 1983-99 sample using an IV strategy.  The choice of instruments is motivated by Figure 2,
which shows a sharp run-up in the number of Yugoslavs among European immigrants in the early and late
1990s.  This figure suggests that distance from the Yugoslav conflict should be a good predictor of the
foreign share in the 1990s.
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The first-stage equation for the IV estimates is
ln(sjt) = τt + ψj + bjtπb + njtπn+ kjtπk + ηijt (8)
where 
bjt = distance from Sarajevo × dummy for 1991-95 (Bosnia War years)
njt = distance from Sarajevo × dummy for 1996-97 (Inter-war years)
kjt = distance from Pristina × dummy for 1998-99 (Kosovo War years)
are the excluded instruments, and τt and ψj are period and country effects.  The distance from potential host
countries is measured either from the nearest city with a population of at least 100,000 or from the capital.
In some specifications, we add the log of the EU foreign share (i.e., ln(ujt)) to this equation as an exogenous21
covariate.  In practice, as we show below, this has little effect on the IV estimates because the EU share is
largely uncorrelated with the instruments.  
The essence of the IV strategy is to look for a break in the time-series behavior of employment rates
for countries relatively close to Yugoslavia.  Therefore, as a specification check, we also estimated models
with a parametric controls for linear country-specific trends, as in the OLS models with trends in Table 5.
The specifications with country trends replaces ψj with ψ0j + ψ1jt in the first stage, in which case a
corresponding term is also included in the second stage (β0j + β1jt) as an additional exogenous covariate.
Conditional on country and year effects, distance from former Yugoslav republics is associated with
a sharply lower immigrant share in the war years.  This can be seen in panel A of Table 6, which reports the
coefficients on bjt, njt, and kjt, plus a pre-war interaction as a specification check.  The coefficients are scaled
so that they represent the effect of 1000 miles.  Thus, the differential distance from Graz, Austria to Liege,
Belgium, about 500 miles,  reduces the non-EU foreign share during the Bosnia War by 30-40 percent (see
columns 1-4 in the table).  
The pattern of estimates in models without trends is consistent with the notion that immigration was
highest during the war years, with a moderate decline in the inter-war years.  Adding country trends changes
the pattern somewhat, but the estimates are not precise enough for the change to be statistically meaningful.
It is perhaps to be expected that the inter-war reduction is not sharp since the inter-war and Kosovo war
dummy are also correlated with the presence of Yugoslavs who stayed in their host countries.   Importantly,
however, the estimates in the last row in panel A shows that adding a dummy for pre-war years to the set of
interactions generates no evidence of a pre-existing immigration trend associated with distance from Sarajevo
for either distance measure. 
As an additional check on the first stage, panel B of Table 6 shows the results of replacing the non-
EU foreign share with the EU foreign share  as the dependent variable in equation (8).  That is, we replace
ln(sjt) with ln(ujt).   These estimates show no relationship between wartime interactions with distance to22
Sarajevo or Pristina and the EU share.  This is encouraging since it suggests the estimates in panel A are
really picking up the effect of immigrants from former Yugoslavia.  Moreover, it means that when
implementing the IV estimation strategy we can reasonably choose to ignore the possibly endogenous
covariate, ln(ujt), since this is essentially uncorrelated with the instruments.  Finally, note that the first-stage
estimates are generally similar whether distance is measured from capital cities or large cities.  But because
the first-stage relationship is stronger when distance is measured from large cities, we used this variable to
construct the second-stage estimates discussed below.
The 2SLS estimates using bjt, njt, and kjt as instruments are reported in Table 7, separately for models
that do and do not control for ln(ujt).  For men, the estimated effects are on the order of -.05 when age groups
are pooled and -.08 for those under 40.  IV estimates for men in models that include country trends are
smaller, though still significant for those over 40.  Adding the EU share as a control variable has little effect
on the estimates in models that do not include country trends.  In models with country trends, the estimates
including the EU share are larger, but this turns out to be due to the fact that the estimates with country trends
are sensitive to the change in sample (from 420 to 402 observations) when the EU share is included.  The
IV estimates for men are consistently negative, and larger in magnitude than the corresponding OLS
estimates.  Taking -.05 as a representative estimate, the IV estimates for men predict that increasing the
foreign share by 10 percent would reduce employment by half of a percent.  On a per-worker basis, this
implies that 100 immigrants in the labor force cost about 75 native jobs, a large effect in levels, though in
the range of the elasticity estimates summarized in Borjas (1994).  It should also be noted, however, that the
estimates with country trends are mostly smaller and not significant.
While the 2SLS estimates for men are imprecise, they suggest a pattern of negative, reasonably stable
effects.   The results for women are harder to interpret.  On one hand, the 2SLS estimates for women show
very large negative effects, clearly too large to be attributable to the effects of immigrants. On the other hand,
the estimates are greatly reduced by controlling for country trends.  The coefficient on the exogenous EU17The statistics quoted in this paragraph are for women aged 25-54 from Table C in OECD (2000). 
Employment trends in our data are similar.  
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share also falls sharply when trends are added to the models for women.  In models with trends, the estimated
effect of the non-EU share on the employment of young women is similar to that for men, while the estimates
for older women are still larger.  Note that percentage effects for women translate into effects on levels that
are about half the size of those for men because of lower female labor force participation rates. 
The marked sensitivity of the estimates for women to the inclusion of country trends suggests these
estimates are probably driven by forces other than increased immigration.  One problem with IV strategy for
women is that some countries saw dramatic changes in female labor force participation (LFP) over this
period while female LFP in other countries was more stable.  In Italy, for example, employment to population
ratios of prime-age women increased by only 3.3 percentage points between 1990 and 1998.  Similarly, in
Greece, female employment rates rose by just 4.5 percentage points.  In Belgium, in contrast, which is much
further away from Yugoslavia, female employment rates rose by 8.4 points.  Similarly, in distant Ireland,
female employment rates rose by 17.5 points.  This sort of contrast in female employment growth probably
induces a spuriously large IV estimate of immigration effects, since the trend growth was typically larger in
countries farther from Sarajevo.  For men, on the other hand, employment rates have been more stable, with
less evidence of trends that differ sharply by country or region.
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IV.  Immigrants Interact with Institutions
In this section, we turn to an empirical investigation of the main question raised in the theoretical
discussion in Section II: how does the impact of immigration on native employment vary with the
restrictiveness of labor market institutions?  In particular, do institutions that make labor markets more rigid
or less competitive change the employment consequences of immigration for natives?  The theoretical section
suggests that restrictive labor standards that affect natives more than immigrants are likely to aggravate any24
job losses from immigration, though firing costs may protect incumbent native workers from dismissal, at
least in the short run.  Higher replacement rates improve natives’ non-work options, reducing employment
levels, and therefore increasing native job loss.  Reduced wage flexibility worsens the employment impact
of immigrants because of scale effects and because rigid wages make native workers less competitive with
immigrants.  Finally, higher entry costs are also predicted to amplify the negative effects of immigrants on
natives since new firms create jobs that would otherwise tend to neutralize any displacement effects.  And
entry costs that reduce employment levels also have a scale effect.
The OLS estimates of immigration effects discussed in the previous section may be biased towards
zero because of endogenous migration, while some of the IV estimates are probably too large to be due solely
to immigration, especially for women.  This may be a consequence of omitted trends correlated with the
instruments.  We therefore continue to present results that control for country trends, as well as OLS
estimates, which arguably provide a lower bound even if the instruments are contaminated.  Our empirical
strategy looks at OLS and IV estimates of interactions with measures of three of the institutional features
discussed in the theory section.  The first is a summary index of labor standards that reflects the extent of
employment protection, restrictions on work hours and employment contracts, administrative or union
oversight in hiring and firing decisions, and minimum wages.  The second is the average replacement rate.
Both measures were taken from Table 4 in Nickell (1997), and are repeated here in the data appendix.  Labor
standards are captured by an index ranging from 0-7, with 7 denoting the most restrictive institutions.
Replacement rates are measured in percent, ranging from 20-90 in our sample.  Finally, we explore
interactions with a measure of entry costs taken from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000).  This is an
index of barriers to entrepreneurship ranging about .5- 2.75 in our sample (reproduced in the appendix).
A.  Estimates of Interaction Effects
The equation used to estimate interactions between immigrants and labor market institutions is18A recent OECD (1999b) study of employment protection shows a negative correlation between measures
of protection and the employment of youth and prime-age women, with a positive relationship for prime-age men.
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ln(yijt) = µi + δt + βj + [α0i + α1ix
~
j]ln(sjt) + νijt,( 9 )
where x
~
j  is a variable characterizing institutions, measured as the deviation from the median institution value
among the countries for which we have data on institutional characteristics.  The parameter α0i therefore
captures the effect of immigration on demographic group i in countries with the median institution value,
while the interaction term, α1i, describes how this effect changes as institutions change.  We therefore think
of α1i as the derivative of e(N, ε) with respect to institutional variables. When ln(sjt) is treated as endogenous,
the instrument list used to estimate equation (9) is augmented with interactions between x
~
j and the
instruments used to estimate equation (7).  Note that this setup fails to identify the effects of the institutions
themselves since our institution variables are time-invariant and absorbed by country effects.
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The analysis of institutions is limited to the sample of men since the 2SLS estimates for women are
considerably more sensitive to control for country trends.  As noted earlier, we believe this sensitivity is due
to the strong country trends in female labor force participation.  These trends appear to vary across countries
in a manner correlated with distance from the Yugoslav conflicts.  
The estimates of equation (9) for men suggest that immigration effects are probably more negative
in countries with less flexible labor markets, higher replacement rates, and higher entry costs. The estimates,
reported in Table 8 for specifications without country trends, begin with an analysis of institution interactions
one at a time.  The table reports estimates of α0i, labeled “Main Effect” and α1i, labeled “Interaction”.  The
first column shows OLS results for men in both age groups.  The interaction with labor standards in this
specification is estimated to be a statistically significant -.0077, indicating that increasing the index of labor
standards’ severity by one unit would increase the negative effect of immigration from -.027 at the median
to about -.035.  The interaction terms are larger for young men than for men over 40.  Similarly, the pooled
interaction with replacement rates is -.0009, so a 10 percentage point increase in replacement rates would26
increase the negative effect of immigration from -.027 at the median to -.036.  The results of including both
labor market interactions are reported in Panel B of the table.  Including both interactions generates OLS
estimates that are similar to, though somewhat smaller than, the estimates generated by including the
interactions one at a time.  Again, the effects are larger for older men. 
The 2SLS estimates for men, reported in columns 4-7, differ from the OLS estimates in that both the
main effects and interaction terms are less precisely estimated.  The OLS and 2SLS estimates of main effects
are similar for models that include interaction terms with labor standards.  The 2SLS estimates of the
interaction terms are much larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, however, and again negative and
significant.  The 2SLS estimates of interaction terms with replacement rates are not significant, and the 2SLS
estimates of main effects in models with replacement rate interactions are not significant.  On the other hand,
the 2SLS estimates of models incorporating interactions with both labor standards and replacement rates
show significant negative interaction terms for labor standards in the pooled and young-men specifications,
with insignificant negative interactions for replacement rates in all specifications.  
As with the measures of labor market flexibility, the results of estimating models allowing
interactions with entry costs show immigration effects that are more negative in countries with barriers to
entry.  For example, the pooled estimate in column (1) suggests that increasing entry barriers by .5, the
difference between Sweden and Denmark, would increase the negative effect of immigration from -.027 at
the median to -.043.  The interactions with entry costs are again larger for men under 40, and larger when
estimated by 2SLS.  The results of our effort to estimate the interaction with entry costs jointly with
interactions with labor market flexibility are less clear cut.  OLS estimates of interactions with entry costs
are similar in magnitude to the results when estimated one at a time, though no longer significant.
Interactions with replacement rates also remain significant and negative in this specification. The
corresponding 2SLS estimates of interactions with entry barriers are much larger (i.e., more negative),
perhaps implausibly so, though the interaction-term standard errors are also large.27
While our ability to distinguish specific institutional mechanisms is limited, the results show a
pattern of negative interactions between immigration and institutional variables that reflect reduced labor
and product market flexibility.  As a further check on the results with institution interactions, we added
country trends, as in the non-interacted models discussed earlier.  This necessarily leads to a loss of precision
since the interactions with institutions are correlated with country-specific linear trends.  The results with
country trends, reported in Table 9, nevertheless show some evidence of negative interactions, and generate
no significant positive estimates.  For example, the OLS estimates of interactions with replacement rates are
negative and significant, as is the 2SLS estimate of the interaction with replacement rates for older men.
These results hold up when replacement rates and labor standards are entered jointly and with entry barriers.
The 2SLS estimates of interactions with barriers to entrepreneurship are also negative and significant when
this is the only interaction term.
V.  Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the question of how immigration affects native employment.
The empirical analysis uses a cross-country panel for European countries with data on employment and
immigration by demographic group since 1983.  We are especially interested in exploring the extent to which
any displacement effects of immigration are mitigated or amplified by reductions in labor market flexibility
and business entry costs.  Our analysis of immigration effects in Europe is facilitated by the availability of
comparable employment and immigration statistics for different countries and demographic groups, and
exploits instrumental variables derived from the immigration shock caused by the two Balkan wars.
The estimates reported here typically show that an increase in the foreign share of 10 percent would
reduce native employment rates by .2 to .7 of a percentage point.  The OLS estimates are at the low end of
this scale, while the IV estimates are mostly larger, implying substantial displacement of native workers by
immigrants.  Such a large effect may be explained by the fact that there has been remarkably little aggregate28
employment creation in most of Western Europe in the last two decades, while immigrant employment has
grown considerably.  Since many immigrants work, their jobs may well have come at the expense of natives.
Of course, effects this large may also signal problems with the IV identification strategy, and the IV estimates
are not very precise.  It therefore seems reasonable to interpret the OLS and IV estimates reported here as
bracketing the true effect. In any case, it is worth noting that even the larger IV estimates of immigration
effects would account for little of the increase in European unemployment rates overall.  
Our main focus is on the question of whether  measures of labor and product-market flexibility
change the impact of immigration on native employment.  This question has important policy ramifications
since many Western European countries are preparing to accept more immigrants, and working to integrate
previous immigrant cohorts more fully.  Though restrictive institutions can play a protective role, our
theoretical framework suggests that institutions such as firing costs, high replacement rates, rigid wages, and
business entry costs, will likely aggravate the negative impact of immigration on equilibrium native
employment.  Part of this interaction is due to scale effects: institutions that reduce employment levels will
tend to make the effect of a given number of immigrants worse.  Higher entry barriers and reduced wage
flexibility also have a direct effect that increases the impact of immigrants on native employment.
The empirical results offer some support for the view that reduced flexibility makes immigrant
absorption more painful, at least when viewed from the perspective of native employment.  Models that allow
the impact of the foreign share on the employment of native men to vary with an index of labor market
flexibility, replacement rates, and entry costs tend to show larger effects when flexibility is reduced and
replacement rates and entry costs increased.  These negative interactions are apparent in the OLS and many
of the IV estimates, though the IV estimates of interaction terms are less precise, especially when country
trends or more than one institutional characteristic is included in the model. 29
APPENDIX
1.  Data
Data for Figures 1 and 2
The data plotted in Figure 1 are from OECD (1999) and earlier volumes in the same series.  The data plotted
in Figure 2 are from http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/99oview/toc.htm (Refugees and Others of Concern to
UNHCR - 1999 Statistical Overview, published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Geneva, July 2000).
The Eurostat Labor Force Survey
The Eurostat LFS data set is documented in Eurostat (1998) and in a variety of memos released with
these data.  The LFS surveys are carried out by national statistical agencies according to guidelines issued
by the European Community.  The sampling frame in all countries covers only private households and not
group quarters.  This is probably important for the coverage of immigrants in some countries.  Sampling
rates, sample sizes, and interview methods (e.g., use of CATI/CAPI) vary from country to country.  The LFS
samples are stratified in a variety of ways, but the sample statistics we received from Eurostat were already
weighted to population counts.  We used these population weights to aggregate cell statistics where necessary
(e.g., to combine age groups).  Our estimates treat country statistics as population parameters, that is, we did
not weight to adjust for differences in country size.  We experimented with alternate weighting schemes and
found weighted-by-population estimates to be similar. Response rates vary from a low of 55-60 percent in
the Netherlands to 98 percent in Germany, with the median response rate at 87 percent.  Labor force status
is defined using a consistent definition based on “actual status in the reference week”.  We checked data
quality and our processing by comparing statistics we constructed with those published in the OECD (2000)
Employment Outlook.  30
Time-consistent Definition of immigrants’ EU status
The analysis here distinguishes non-natives and non-nationals according to home country
membership in the EU.  This distinction is complicated in practice by the fact that the list of EU member
countries changed a number of times over the sample period, and home countries are not always identified
separately.  Moreover, we cannot distinguish East from West Germany in the pre-unification period.  Our
analysis uses a time-consistent definition of EU membership, though this definition differs slightly for the
1983-99 and 1992-99 sample periods.  For 1983-99, we define the EU as the original EU-12 plus Austria and
Norway.  All immigrants from Germany are defined as EU (the results are not sensitive to the classification
of German immigrants as being from a non-EU country).  For 1992-99, we define the EU as the EU-15 plus
Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland.
Cell Statistics and Confidentiality Edit 
At our request, Eurostat provided us with tabulations of LFS cell statistics by country, year, age,
schooling group, nationality, and nativity.  Research data provided by Eurostat are released with the
stipulation that cell statistics below country-specific thresholds not be released or used in statistical analyses.
The results reported here use only those cells above the disclosure thresholds, as determined by a table
provided by Eurostat.  The restrictions we used are those from “column A” of the Eurostat Guidelines table,
as described in the latest release of the “New Chronos” data set.31
Distance and Labor-Market Flexibility variables
Distance measures are as-the-crow-flies distance in miles from Sarajevo and Pristina to the capital city or
the nearest city with a population over 100,000.  Replacement rates and the labor standards index are from
Nickell (1997; Table 4).  Barriers to entrepreneurship are from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000;
A3.2).
Country    Distance from Replacement Labor Entry
       Sarajevo            Pristina rate standards barriers
Big city Capitals   Big city Capitals
AT 262.5  318.8       412.5   450.0  50 5 1.60
BE 759.4  806.3       909.4   965.6 60 4 2.55
CH 534.4    571.9       693.8   731.3 70 3 2.24
DE 440.6    712.5       590.6   862.5 63 6 2.10
DK 862.5  853.1       993.8   965.6 90 2 1.32
ES 843.8   1162.5      975.0   1293.8 70 7 1.77
FI 1143.8  1143.8      1209.4 1209.4 63 5 1.93
FR 553.1    834.4        703.1   993.8 57 6 2.73
GR 318.8  487.5       168.9   356.3  1.66
IE 1293.8  1293.8      1443.8 1443.8 37 4 1.20
IS 1903.1  2081.3      2043.8 2231.3 
IT 234.4   328.1        243.8   450.0    20 7 2.74
LU 693.8  693.8       862.5   862.5
NL 834.4   853.1        984.4   1003.1 70 5 1.41
NO 1153.1  1153.1      1256.3 1256.3 65 5 1.33
PT 1387.5  1481.3      1537.5 1612.5 65 4 1.46
SE 843.8   1059.4      956.3   1153.1 80 7 1.80
UK 1003.1  1003.1      1162.5 1162.5 38 0 0.48
2.  Derivations
Derivation of short-run employment change, (5)
Differentiate the equilibrium condition, (4), with respect to I:





* = gNN/gN and gNI
*=gNI/gN.  Therefore 
MN/MI = [(fNN/fN)θgI + gNI
*][(1/ε)N
-1 - (fNN/fN)θgN - gNN
*]
-1.( A 1 )
It is straightforward to show that for ρ<1, gNN
* = ((1-ρ)/N)[(N/g)
ρ - 1] < 0, and gNI
* = γ((1-ρ)/I)(I/g)
ρ > 0, while
with ρ=1 (perfect substitutes), gNN
*=gNI
*=0.  Note that NgNN
* and IgNI
* are elasticities of complementarity, as
in Lalonde and Topel (1991).  These terms sum to zero with constant returns and capture the complementarity32
that makes immigration effects ambiguous.  
To produce the expression in the text, note that the native labor demand curve (ignoring firing costs)
is defined by
wN = fNθgN.
Differentiate with respect to N and re-arrange to show that along the labor demand curve
(MwN/MN)(N/wN) / ξNN = N(fNN/fN)θgN + NgNN
*
Similarly, 
(MwN/MI)(I/wN) / ξNI = I(fNN/fN)θgI + IgNI
*.





Derivation of long-run employment change, (6)
Note that
MN
*/MM = m(MN/MM) + N(Mm/MM)
Write the first order condition, (2a), as
lnfN(θg[N,Mm
-1]) + lnθ + lngN[N,Mm
-1] =  (1/ε)lnN + (1/ε)lnm + ln(1 + φλcN) - lnP - ln(1-r)
Differentiate and re-arrange to get
(MN/MM){(1/ε)N






m(MN/MM) =  {(fNN/fN)θgI + gNI
*}{(1/ε)N




= (N/I)e(N, ε){1-(Mlnm/MlnM)} - (ε∆)
-1(Mm/MM).
Now, add N(Mm/MM) to get
MN
*/MM= (N/I)e(N, ε){1-(Mlnm/MlnM)} + (Mm/MM)[N - (ε∆)
-1].
Note that N - (ε∆)
-1 = [N∆ - (1/ε)]/∆ and N∆  = (1/ε) - ξNN, so33
MN
*/MM= (N/I)e(N, ε){1-(Mlnm/MlnM)} - (Mm/MM)[ξNN/∆].
Multiply both sides by I/N = M/mN to get
(MN
*/MM)(M/N
*) = e(N, ε){1-(Mlnm/MlnM)} - ξNN[ε
-1 - ξNN]
-1 (Mlnm/MlnM).
Effect of immigration on profits in the short run
As noted in the text, profits clearly increase if the wages of natives fall after immigration.  But suppose
immigrant-native complementarity is strong enough that wages of natives increase.  With m taken to be fixed,
solve for MwN/MM and MwI/MM by differentiating the first order conditions, (2a) and (2b), then substitute into
MΠ/MM to get:
-(N(MwN/MM) +I(MwI/MM)) = -[gN (MN/MM) + (gI/m)]fNNθ
2g.
If native wages go up, then native employment must go up as well, so MN/MM is positive.  The expression in
brackets is therefore also positive and profits increase.  If the production function exhibits constant returns,
however, fNN(·)=0, and profits are unchanged.
Proof that the long-run impact is zero with ρ=1
Again, solve for MwN/MM and MwI/MM by differentiating the first order conditions, (2a) and (2b), but retain
terms involving Mlnm/MlnM.  Then substitute the resulting expressions into MΠ/MM = 0, or, equivalently,
N(MwN/MM) +I(MwI/MM)=0, to obtain
Mlnm/MlnM = 1 + m(MN/MM)(gN/gI).
Next, use this to substitute for Mlnm/MlnM in the expression for (MN
*/MM)(M/N
*).  Finally, re-arrange, and use
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Table 1 











Non-Nationals   
Proportion EU Non-
Nationals    E/P (Nationals) 
     1989 1996 1999   1989 1996 1999   1989 1996  1999 
A. EU-12 
FRG  1983-90  –  5.01 –  –    3.22 –  –    71.6  –  – 
Germany  1991-99  36,622  – 6.08  6.13    – 2.79  2.73    –  73.6  75.7 
France  1983-99  24,992  3.72 3.88 3.85    2.94 2.40 2.30    72.2  71.9  72.4 
Italy  1992-99  21,892  – 0.38  0.86    – 0.06  0.13    –  58.6  60.3 
Netherlands  83,85,87-99  7,183  2.19 2.09 1.74    1.67 1.74 1.74    66.3  72.8  78.1 
Belgium  1983-99  4,206  2.28 2.27 2.66    4.84 5.96 6.12    64.9  74.3  71.0 
Luxembourg  1983-99  174  2.26  3.98  4.68    30.0   35.8  37.2      64.0  65.3  68.6 
U.K.  1983-99  25,829  2.94 2.18 2.39    1.77 1.55 1.68    76.5  75.3  77.5 
Ireland  1983-99  1,502  0.47 0.80 1.00    2.16 2.98 2.66    56.6  63.6  70.2 
Denmark  1983-99  2,564  1.16 1.40 1.59    0.79 0.79 1.00    81.3  79.8  82.5 
Greece  1983-99  4,034  0.51 1.67 3.78    0.11 0.19 0.21    64.2  64.6  64.7 
Spain  1986-99  15,118  0.15 0.48 0.89    0.14 0.33 0.37    55.6  54.9  60.4 
Portugal  1986-99  4,375  0.59 1.03 1.06    –  0.22 0.34    72.9  72.0  75.8 
B. EU – Other 
Austria  1995-99  3,590  – 8.47  8.19    – 1.22  1.44    –  74.3  75.6 
Finland  1995-99  2,406  – 0.73  1.09    –  – 0.14    –  69.0  76.1 
Sweden  1995-99  4,007  – 3.89  3.01    – 0.71  1.28    –  78.8  79.5 
C. Other EEA 
Iceland  1995-99  128  – –  1.27    – – –    –  87.1  89.0 
Norway  1995-99  2,072  – 1.82  1.97    – 1.00  1.18    –  81.0  83.5 
Switzerland  1996-99  3,479  – 5.56  5.83    – 17.5  16.0    –  82.7  85.1 
Notes: The table reports weighted counts in thousands and proportions in the indicated period.  All statistics are for men and 




Nationality and Nativity in 1996 
  Proportion of Non-
nationals   Naturalization  Rate 
 
 























Germany 72.3  95.1    12.9  66.0    10.0  48.1 
France 93.8  96.0    37.4  50.6    0.0  0.3 
Netherlands 81.2 97.2    36.7  58.0    4.2  14.5 
Belgium 68.4  93.3    30.3  35.6    2.7  8.9 
Luxembourg 87.0  96.8    7.8  13.9    1.1  0.5 
U.K. 94.2  98.1    28.0  57.4    1.1  7.5 
Ireland 94.0  94.1    46.3  29.1    12.0  10.5 
Denmark 89.6  96.4    43.1  46.1    6.2 7.7 
Greece 82.0  95.4    81.3  60.2    57.5  43.5 
Spain 83.2  97.7    70.1  61.8    0.0  0.0 
Portugal 74.2  98.1    77.7  94.1    56.4  31.3 
B. EU – Other 
Austria 69.0  93.9    44.3  27.2    6.7  5.5 
Finland 59.2  98.6    83.0  25.7    0.0  0.0 
Sweden 69.4  92.1    42.5  56.5    22.4  10.2 
C. Other EEA 
Iceland 82.6  84.1    58.6  44.0    0.0  0.0 
Norway 827  94.3    41.5  45.5    1.9  2.8 
Note:  Statistics are for men and women aged 20-59.  Data for Germany are for 1992.  The LFS does not 
distinguish nationality and nativity for Italy.  Entries of zero denote small counts in cells or cells below the 
LFS disclosure threshold.  Nativity variables are missing for Switzerland. 
 
 Table 3 
Characteristics of Immigrants and Natives 
 Men   Women   






















A. Labor Force Participation Rate 
Germany  90.3 77.5 88.8  −   −   75.4 50.4 68.7  −   −  
France  88.2 67.7 87.5 72.2 86.1 73.9 33.4 57.8 69.6 72.1 
Italy  82.8 93.5 90.4 75.2 69.0 51.0 51.9 57.3 39.4  −  
Netherlands  90.2 55.8 78.3 50.4 75.5 68.1 37.7 53.9 32.3 60.0 
Belgium  85.3 72.2 76.1 78.1 79.1 65.3 33.1 43.7 21.7 52.2 
Luxembourg  85.1 86.7 84.8 88.3 84.7 51.4 42.0 53.9 45.1 44.4 
U.K.  90.0 71.1 86.7 59.6 80.7 73.6 45.1 61.7 52.6 58.5 
Ireland  87.7 57.4 84.7  −   −   57.6 34.8 61.0  −   −  
Denmark  91.0 68.0 76.1 64.7 90.0 80.6 34.1 65.0 21.0 71.9 
Greece  89.0 93.3 92.4 93.7 97.5 53.8 67.7 60.3 71.1 54.8 
Spain  86.3 94.1 90.1  −   81.0 54.2 62.7 61.5  −   56.6 
Portugal  89.2 89.6 74.5  −   −   71.4 68.8 59.6  −   −  
Austria  88.2 86.8 90.9 90.9 92.2 69.7 52.8 69.6 56.5 78.7 
Finland  84.8 76.6 80.5  −   61.3 79.5 53.4 69.1  −   −  
Sweden  88.7 61.9 81.1 65.2 79.2 84.4 41.7 68.1 49.6 63.9 
Norway  89.8 75.5 76.3 46.7 80.4 80.8 46.9 64.4 34.0 69.1 
B. Employment/Population 
Germany  83.3 62.2 80.4  −   −   68.7 39.5 61.5  −   −  
France  80.0 42.1 69.8 45.4 67.5 64.0 20.8 43.1 66.1 55.6 
Italy  75.3 87.0 85.4 58.7 69.0 42.9 39.6 50.0 20.8  −  
Netherlands  87.4 37.3 68.1 32.7 65.9 64.2 26.9 48.1 19.1 52.8 
Belgium  80.0 51.6 58.7 27.4 64.1 58.3 21.0 32.2 21.7 35.3 
Luxembourg  83.8 80.5 80.0 79.3 79.8 50.0 37.9 49.4 39.3 37.5 
U.K.  83.1 60.2 76.8 28.3 56.1 69.7 37.7 56.2 41.1 55.5 
Ireland  78.9 48.9 77.7  −   −   52.2 29.1 55.8  −   −  
Denmark  87.2 52.8 64.4 45.7 74.9 75.3 27.5 54.0 21.0 61.8 
Greece  83.5 82.3 83.4 83.6 86.6 45.7 51.6 49.0 48.8 49.6 
Spain  73.6 73.9 75.7 84.3 81.0 39.7 51.1 44.7  −   56.6 
Portugal  86.2 76.7 60.4  −   −   68.1 53.2 47.9  −   −  
Austria  84.4 76.9 82.0 78.3 83.0 66.7 44.9 64.3 48.9 74.2 
Finland  74.0 48.6 61.6  −   46.3 69.4 38.0 55.2  −   −  
Sweden  81.4 38.9 60.9 37.9 62.1 78.8 23.8 55.3 25.8 51.2 
Norway  86.9 64.2 69.0 31.9 80.4 77.8 38.0 59.3 21.4 52.3 
Notes: The table reports statistics for male and female immigrants and natives aged 20-59.  Data are unavailable for 
Switzerland and unreliable for Iceland.  A dash denotes entries below the LFS confidentiality threshold.    
Table 4 
 OLS Estimates of Effects of Non-EU Share 92-99 



























N   642   321  321   214  214  214 












N   592   296  296   196  198  198 












N   586   293  293   194  196  196 
B. Women 












N   642   321  321   214  214  214 












N   592   296  296   196  198  198 












N   586   293  293   194  196  196 
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficient on log share of non-nationals or non-natives from 
non-EU countries in equation (7) in the text.  All models include country and year effects. Pooled 
models include main effects for demographic groups. Robust standard errors are reported in 




 OLS Estimates by Sex, Age, and Schooling Group 











































N    684    342 342    228  228  228 






      






      




















      
N    402    201 201         
B. Women 
























N    684    342 342    228  228  228 






      






      




















      
N    402    201 201         
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficient on log share of non-nationals from non-EU and EU 
countries in equation (7) in the text.  All models include country and year effects.  Pooled models include main 




 First Stage Estimates 
  Distance to Nearest Big City  Distance to Capitals 
Instruments  No Trends  With Trends  No Trends  With Trends 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
A. Non-Nationals from Non-EU Countries 
 


















          


















          


















          










          
F-Statistic for excluded instruments  6.96 3.97 6.67 5.39 3.18 1.25 5.98 4.79 
 
B. Non-Nationals from EU Countries 
 
















          
















          
















          








            
F-Statistic for excluded instruments  1.27 1.34 0.43 0.43 1.34 1.28 0.14 0.14 
Note:  The table reports the effects of dummies for Balkan war years interacted with the distance between Sarajevo (or Pristina) and 
the nearest big cities (or entry ports) on the log share of non-nationals from non-EU and EU countries.  This is equation (8) in the text.  
Coefficients are scaled to show the impact of 1,000 miles distance.  The Bosnia war years are 1991-95 and the Kosovo war years are 
1998-99.  The years 1996-97 are the inter-war period.  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  All models include country 
and year effects. Sample sizes are 201 observations for non-nationals from non-EU countries and 202 observations for non-nationals 
from EU countries. 
  
Table 7: IV Estimates 
 
    No Trends    With Trends   


















A.  Without share of Non-Nationals from EU Countries 
 










































B. With share of Non-Nationals from EU Countries 
 



































































Notes:  The table reports IV estimates of equation (7) in the text.  The non-EU immigration-share 
variable is treated as endogenous, while the EU share variable is treated as exogenous.  
 
Table 8 
Interactions with Institutions:  Estimates for Men 
 OLS   2SLS    
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  368 184 184 368 184 184 















































  334 167 167 334 167 167 
Standards, Rep. 























































N    334 167 167 334 167 167 
Note: The table reports estimates of main effects and interaction terms in equation (9) in the text.  All 
models include the EU foreign share as an exogenous regressor.  Instruments for the foreign share are as in 
Table 7, plus interactions with institutional measures.    Main effects are evaluated at the median institution 
(5 for labor standards, 63 for replacement rates, and 1.72 for barriers to entrepreneurship).  
 
Table 9 
Interactions with Institutions:  Estimates for Men with Country Trends 
 OLS   2SLS    
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Standards, Rep. 























































N    334 167 167 334 167 167 
Note: The table reports estimates of main effects and interaction terms in equation (9) in the text.  All 
models include the EU foreign share as an exogenous regressor.  Instruments for the foreign share are as in 
Table 7, plus interactions with institutional measures.    Main effects are evaluated at the median institution 
(5 for labor standards, 63 for replacement rates, and 1.72 for barriers to entrepreneurship). Figure 1. Foreign inflows.  Log count minus 1983 base.  Data from population registers except for France.




































































































Number of asylum 
seekers
Proportion of asylum 
seekers
Proportion of EU inflows
Figure 2. Number of Yugoslavian asylum applicants to Europe, Yugoslav proportion of total, and Yugoslavians as a proportion of 
total foreign inflows to selected EU countries.  Data for 1992-99 include asylum applicants from both Yugoslavia and Bosnia.
Sources: Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR, 1999 Statistical Overview and OECD Trends in International MigrationFigure 3. EU foreign share plotted against non-EU foreign share,
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